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The Class Action Notice Under the
FLSA: Denial is a Threat to Effective
Remedies in ADEA Actions
Barbara McAdoo*
I. Introduction
A split in the Circuit Courts of Appeal has the potential effec-
tively to destroy the class action tool for age discrimination plaintiffs.
Since 1977, six circuit courts have ruled on whether plaintiffs in an
action brought under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") can send notice of the pending action to other poten-
tial plaintiffs.2 This issue was first decided in the negative by the
prestigious Ninth Circuit.' During the following eight years, five
other appeals courts considered the issue of notice and each court
reached a different conclusion.4 The result is uncertainty for plain-
tiffs and plaintiffs' counsel, including the possibility of risking court
displeasure or, perhaps, disciplinary proceedings for communicating
with persons who may have a legal right to join an FLSA class
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, B.A., 1970, Principia
College; J.D., 1979, George Washington University. The author expresses thanks to readers
Dean Stephen Young, Professor William Martin, and Linda Freyer, J.D.; and to research
assistant Timothy Wuestenhagen.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1977), discussed at length in this article. See generally infra text
accompanying notes 64-73.
2. The enforcement scheme of § 216(b) does not specifically provide for sending notice
to prospective plaintiffs to the action. This contrasts with the notice provisions of FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(c)(2).
3. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979) (nothing in the Act prohibits the giving of notice; therefore,
the district court may give notice in appropriate cases); Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686
F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982) (the district court has the power to regulate the content and distribu-
tion of notice to potential plaintiffs, but the notice should bear no indicia of judicial sponsor-
ship); Haynes v. Singer Co. Inc., 696 F.2d 884 (11 th Cir. 1984) (the court ruled that the issue
of notice was not properly before it and refused to rule on it); Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp.,
725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984) (nothing in the Act permits the district court to authorize
notice; plaintiffs may be able to give notice providing they do not violate the rules regarding
client solicitation); McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984) (no
notice to potential plaintiffs by the court, the attorneys, or the actual named plaintiffs al-
lowed). Lower court decisions have split on the notice issue. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.
Fed. 282 (1984) (collecting § 216(b) notice cases). See also infra note 62 for the Third Cir-
cuit's and the District of Columbia Circuit's treatment of the issue.
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action.5
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"),' enacted as an amendment to the FLSA, incorporates
the enforcement procedures of section 216(b). Thus, the resolution of
the notice issue is of great concern to ADEA plaintiffs' counsel to
ensure that this "remedial" legislation is not weakened by a restraint
on the class action procedural tool.7 Unless clear guidance is forth-
coming from the United States Supreme Court, Congress should
amend the FLSA specifically to allow notice to potential class action
plaintiffs.8
II. The Split in the Circuits: What's a Plaintiff to Do?
In the 1977 case, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes,9 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals determined that plaintiffs in an FLSA suit
could not send notice of the pending action and consent-to-join forms
to other potential plaintiffs. The next year the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals read the statute as permitting a district court to order
notice in an "appropriate" case. 10 Several years later the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals added another interpretation in a case
brought under the ADEA. In Woods v. New York Life Insurance
Co." the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was clear in its opinion
that notice could not be forbidden, but rejected as improper the ac-
tion of a district court in sending out notices on court letterhead. The
court specifically approved the procedure whereby plaintiffs sought a
court order on the content of the notice to give the court the oppor-
tunity to regulate both the content and the distribution of the no-
tice.12 When the issue of notice came before the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, that court refused to issue a definitive statement,
deciding simply that the case before it was not an "appropriate" one
5. It is possible that providing notice reaches the level of attorney solicitation proscribed
by rules of professional conduct. See Partlow v. Jewish Orphan's Home of Southern California,
645 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494 (W.D. Va. 1982); Johnson
v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 90
F.R.D. 638 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982).
7. Several writers have questioned whether effective group relief through private action
under the FLSA is possible. See Foster, Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 295, 328-
29 (1975) [hereinafter Foster], where the writer examined whether class actions are emascu-
lated by the procedural problems of the FLSA.
8. See infra Section VII.
9. 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra text accompanying notes 18-56.
10. Braunstein, 600 F.2d at 336. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
11. 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 581.
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for notice.13 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district
court decision affirming its Magistrate's opinion denying the plain-
tiff's motion for "Leave to Give Notice to Class Members. 1 14 Fi-
nally, the Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit held that neither
the district court, nor plaintiff's counsel, could properly contact pro-
spective class members. 5
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to
allow notice is correct in light of the legislative history of both the
FLSA and the ADEA. 6 Unless the Supreme Court hears a case and
sorts out the confusion on this issue,17 the denial of notice in age
discrimination class actions will promote a proliferation of lawsuits
and deny an intended remedy to many age discrimination victims.
III. The Ninth Circuit Decision
In Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that class action plaintiffs in an FLSA action are pro-
hibited from sending notice of the pending action to other potential
plaintiffs. 8 The decision rests on three bases: (1) an FLSA section
216(b) class action is different from a class action under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the adoption of any por-
tion of Rule 23 procedures in an FLSA section 216(b) proceeding
would be contrary to congressional intent;19 (2) the due process con-
cerns inherent in a Rule 23 Class action compelling notice to poten-
tial plaintiffs do not exist in an FLSA section 216(b) proceeding; 0
and (3) the policy concern of avoiding additional solicited litigation
prevents notification of potential plaintiffs.' An analysis of the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning'on each of these points, however, reveals
questionable legal conclusions in this precedent setting case.
13. Haynes v. Singer Co., 696 F.2d 884 (11th Cir. 1984).
14. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984). Arguably, the dis-
trict court disagreed with the magistrate's interpretation of the legal standard, but felt bound
by a limited scope of review. The Court of Appeals intimated that if the court is not involved
in sanctioning notice, plaintiffs or plaintiff's counsel may be able to provide notice. Id. at 1268.
15. McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 62-103.
17. The United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari in any case, including
Braunstein, 600 F.2d at 335.
18. Kinney Shoe, 564 F.2d at 864.
19. Id. at 862.
20. Id. at 864.
21. Id. at 863.
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A. FLSA Section 216(b) Actions are Different than Rule 23,
FRCP Actions
There can be no disagreement with the statement that FLSA
Section 216(b) actions are different than Rule 23, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure actions. The issue only warrants discussion because
of the historical relationship between FLSA Section 216(b) and
Rule 23. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were originally enacted in 1938, and both pro-
vided for class action remedies. The original language of section
216(b) of the FLSA stated that one or more employees could main-
tain an action to recover minimum wages or overtime compensation
"for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees sim-
ilarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an
agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of
all employees similarly situated . . . ." An action under section
216(b), therefore, could be maintained by an employee, by a group
of employees, or by an agent/representative who might or might not
be an employee.23
The original Rule 23 provided for class actions in a variety of
different contexts. 2' Its categories, "true," "hybrid," and "spurious,"
proved extremely difficult, however, for courts to interpret and apply
consistently. Moore's description of the Rule 23 categories described
the "true" class suit in terms of joinder: since the right to be en-
22. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938).
23. An example of an agent/representative suit was when a nonemployee union repre-
sentative brought an action on behalf of a group of employees, thus insulating individual em-
ployees from employer displeasure. See Foster, supra note 7, at 323 n. 101.
24. FED. R. Civ. P., 23 (1963). The original Rule 23 read as follows:
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or
be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled
to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
The categories of Rule 23 class actions, supposedly divided by the nature of the rights in-
volved, became identified as "true" class actions (23(a)(1)), "hybrid" class actions (23(a)(2)),
and "spurious," class actions (23(a)(3)). See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some
Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.i. 551, 570-76 (1937). See also Keefe,
Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 329-30 (1948) [hereinafter
Keefe, Levy & Donovan].
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forced was joint, common, or derivative, without the class action de-
vice the joinder of all interested persons would be essential.25 In con-
trast, the "spurious" class suit was described as a permissive joinder
device to be utilized by numerous persons having a common question
of law or fact.2 6 Theoretically, what distinguished further the catego-
ries of Rule 23 was the effect of the judgment upon class members.
In a "true" class action, the judgment was supposed to be binding on
the entire class, whether parties or not. 7 In the "spurious" class ac-
tion, a decree did not bind anyone who was not a party to the ac-
tion.2 8 In part, the effect of the judgment may have turned on the
question of whether proper notice had been given to the purported
class.29 Adding perhaps one more level of confusion, in the period
between 1938 and 1966, FLSA section 216(b) lawsuits were most
often considered to be "spurious" class actions under Rule 23.80
In 1947, Congress amended the FLSA.a1 The confusion sur-
rounding the binding effect of class action judgments was addressed
specifically by requiring each prospective plaintiff in a section 216(b)
lawsuit to consent affirmatively, or "opt into" the lawsuit, in order to
be bound by the judgment.8 2 Not until 1966 did amendments to the
25. See supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. See Farmers Co-op Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101, 104-05 (8th Cir.
1942).
28. Ayer v. Kember, 48 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 284 U.S. 639 (1931); Carrol v.
Associated Musicians of Greater New York, 206 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Cutler v.
American Federation of Musicians, 211 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The question whether
one could become a party and intervene after judgment had been rendered in a case also raised
troubling questions for the courts. Allowing post-judgment intervention provided a logical dis-
tinction between Rule 23(a)(3) and the Rule 20 permissive joinder provisions. See Kalven, Jr.
and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941);
Foster, supra note 7, at 325-27; Comment, The Spurious Class Suit: Procedural and Practical
Problems Confronting Court and Counsel, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 627, 628 n. 10 (1958).
29. The 1966 Advisory Committee Notes discuss the difficulties under original Rule 23,
specifically the fact that the classification system proved "obscure and uncertain .... The
courts had considerable difficulty with these terms . . . .Nor did the rule provide an adequate
guide to the proper extent of the judgments in class actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory
Committee Note (1966). See Keefe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 24, at 327.
30. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Sinclair v. United States
Gypsum Co., 75 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1948). Some courts decided that Rule 23 and FLSA
§ 216(b) did not need each other to exist. See Smith v. Stark Trucking, 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D.
Ohio 1943). One writer who analyzed early FLSA opinions concluded that they had a "make-
shift character" about them. See Foster, supra note 7, at 326.
31. Portal to Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified as 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-9 (1976)).
32. The new language read: "No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). Portal to Portal Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) [codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976)].
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure produce a wholly new Rule 23. as
Discarding the confusing "pure," "hybrid," and "spurious" classifi-
cations, the new Rule 23 described
in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class ac-
tions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as
such will result in judgments including those whom the court
finds to be members of the class, whether or not the judgment is
favorable to the class; and refers to the measures which can be
taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions."
The new Rule 23 provided that judgments would bind each member
of a potential class unless a member affirmatively "opted out" of the
lawsuit. To ensure that a class member had an opportunity to "opt
out" of the lawsuit, Rule 23(c)(2) provided for notice to be given to
every potential class member.35 The Advisory Committee Notes to
revised Rule 23 indicate that the Rule 23 revisions were not intended
to affect section 216(b) of the FLSA."
Apparently the Ninth Circuit concluded in Kinney Shoe that
since modern Rule 23 and FLSA section 216(b) class actions had
irreconcilable differences,87 no aspect of Rule 23 procedures (e.g.,
notice) can be utilized in a section 216(b) class action.38 To reach
this conclusion, however, two hurdles not considered by that court
should have been cleared.
First, it is important to consider historically whether notice was
allowed, or at least not prohibited, in FLSA section 216(b) or pre-
1966 Rule 23 "spurious" class actions. Although the issue is rarely
discussed, early FLSA or spurious class action cases suggest that no-
tice was utilized by courts, or at least was assumed to be available.8 9
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee Note (1966).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Specifically, the rule required that in a class action main-
tamined under subdivision (b)(3), the court direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members identified
through reasonable effort. Further, "the notice [must] advise each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel."
Id.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee Note (1966).
37. The Court of Appeals noted that "[alt least two circuits have held that Rule 23 and
§ 216(b) class actions are 'mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.'" Kinney Shoe Corp. 564
F.2d at 862.
38. Id.
39. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Cherner v. Transitron Elec-
tronics Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962); Hormel v. United States, 17 F.R.D. 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941);
Webster Eisenlohr v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944); Timberlake v. Day & Zimmer-
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The possibility that attorney notice to nonparties might involve im-
proper solicitation was advanced in some early cases.40 But no court
explicitly prohibited notice. Neither the 1947 Amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act nor the 1966 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure made any mention of, or change to, the
practice of providing notice to potential plaintiffs in a section 216(b)
"spurious" class action."
A second point the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently
overlooked is that notice is not peculiarly a post-1966 Rule 23 op-
tion. Rather, notice is a procedure the judiciary utilizes to manage
its workload. 42 The Court misplaced its focus on the obvious differ-
ences between Rule 23 .and FLSA section 216(b), without address-
ing whether there are inherent prohibitions to the giving of notice in
a section 216(b) action. Nothing in the legislative history of either
section 216(b) or Rule 23 prohibits the court from allowing notice to
be given to "spurious" class action plaintiffs.
B. Due Process Does Not Require Notice Under FLSA Section
216(b)
The second principal relied upon by the court of appeals in Kin-
ney Shoe is that the due process concerns which compel notice to
potential plaintiffs in a Rule 23 class action do not exist in FLSA
section 216(b) proceedings.48 Even those courts which disagree with
the Kinney Shoe court's conclusion that notice cannot be given to
potential plaintiffs agree with the court on this point. Notice to
Rule 23(b)(3) class action plaintiffs must be given as a matter of
due process because those plaintiffs who do not "opt-out" of the law-
suit will be bound by its judgment." In an FLSA section 216(b)
lawsuit, no one who has not specifically consented to be bound by the
judgment will be bound."° Therefore, the due process concerns com-
pelling notice in a Rule 23 class action are absent from a section
man, Inc., 3 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) (S.D. Iowa 1943).
40. Cherner, 201 F. Supp. at 936-37; People v. Ashton, 180 N.E. 440 (Ill. 1932).
41. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702.03 (1979) (Congress acquiesces
in common-law interpretation when it does not change statute).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and 83. See also Lipschultz, The Class Action Suit under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Current Status, Controversies, and Suggested Clari-
fications, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1395 (1981); Note, Notice of Collective Actions Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act: McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 665 (1985).
43. 564 F.2d at 863.
44. See Braunstein, 600 F.2d at 336; Woods, 686 F.2d at 579-80.
45. Bullock v. Adm'r of Estate of Kircher, 84 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D.N.J. 1979).
46. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
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216(b) lawsuit. This conclusion, however, does not add anything to
the resolution of the notice issue. A notice provision was legally nec-
essary in revised Rule 23. This does not compel the conclusion that
notice in a section 216(b) proceeding should be prohibited. Histori-
cally, notice was sometimes given in "spurious" class actions.4 7 The*
advent of the 1966 changes to Rule 23 did not suddenly prohibit the
practice of notice in "spurious" class actions, e.g., in FLSA section
216(b) proceedings.
C. The Improper Solicitation of Claims
The final basis for the Court's ruling in Kinney Shoe is the pol-
icy concern of involving the plaintiff or the court in the solicitation of
claims.48 Although there may be a historical basis for this concern,4'
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is incorrect, especially in light of re-
cent Supreme Court cases providing First Amendment protection to
lawyer advertising and communications with class members.
Both the majority opinion of the Supreme Court and Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 0
are instructive. In Ohralik, the Court upheld the discipline of an at-
torney who solicited business from potential clients in person. The
Court stated: "Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides
information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-
person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an imme-
diate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection." 51 Justice Marshall, after citing the obligation of all law-
yers to ensure that legal aid is available to members of the commu-
nity, enlarged upon the opinion in his concurrence as follows:
The provision of such information about legal rights and reme-
dies is an important function, even where the rights and reme-
dies are of a private nature involving no constitutional or politi-
cal overtones . . . .Where honest, unpressured "commercial"
solicitation is involved . . .I believe it is open to doubt whether
the state's interests are sufficiently compelling to warrant the re-
striction on free flow of information which results from a sweep-
ing nonsolicitation rule and against which the First Amendment
47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48. 564 F.2d at 863.
49. See Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(this decision makes reference to Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975)).
50. 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 457.
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ordinarily protects."s
Cases litigated under section 216(b) of the FLSA which are consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's reasoning have recognized that giving
notice to potential plaintiffs does not constitute improper solicitation
so long as the notice is neither misleading nor deceitful, and it does
not pressure any plaintiff to hire the particular lawyer already em-
ployed by the named plaintiff or plaintiffs."8 Rather, notice simply
insures that potential plaintiffs hear of the lawsuit so they can make
an informed decision whether to join the action. This promotes the
"avoidance of multiple law suits" but avoids the "unabashed solicita-
tion of law suits for private pecuniary gain." 54 Since the FLSA and
the ADEA are "remedial" pieces of legislation, they are to be af-
forded a liberal interpretation to effectuate their purposes whenever
necessary and possible."5 Some writers have concluded that without
an effective class action remedy, the elimination of age discrimina-
tion in employment will be difficult, if not impossible.56 The Kinney
Shoe opinion reaches the conclusion that notification of potential
plaintiffs necessarily flies in the face of prohibitions against claim
solicitation. This conclusion is legally unwarranted, and it effectively
emasculates the class action remedy in ADEA suits.
IV. The Seventh Circuit Decision
In Woods v. New York Life Insurance Co.57 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to con-
sider the question of notice in a lawsuit brought specifically under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In Woods, plaintiffs
convinced the district court to mail notice of the suit to prospective
members of the plaintiff class on the letterhead of the district court,
signed by the clerk of court. The district court then certified the no-
tice issue for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).
The Court clarified the issue under the "power to notify":
[If-the question meant to be asked is whether the plaintiff in a
section [2]16(b) action may communicate, under terms and con-
52. Id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
54. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983), dismissed, 747 F.2d 1.74
(3d Cir. 1984).
55. Braunstein, 600 F.2d at 336.
56. Lipschultz, supra note 42; Foster, supra note 7; Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious
Class: Opting-in to the Age Discrimination In Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act
Through the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71 Gao. U. 119 (1982) [hereinafter Spahn].
57. 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982).
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ditions prescribed by the court, with other members of the class,
we think the answer is yes. But if the question meant to be
asked is whether the notice should go out on court letterhead
over the signature of a court official, we think the answer is no.58
The decision is preeminently practical. The court discussed the
fact that plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel can communicate without re-
straint with potential class members prior to filing a lawsuit. Once a
lawsuit has been commenced, however, the court inferred from sec-
tion 216(b) itself and from Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the duty for plaintiffs and their counsel to notify defend-
ants of communications with potential plaintiffs and the power of the
court to regulate the content and distribution of such notice. "Once a
section [2]16(b) action is commenced, the defendant has a vital in-
terest in, and the court a managerial responsibility regarding, the
joinder of additional parties plaintiff, and these concerns support the
modest duty and power that we infer.""
Specifically rejecting the idea that the power to regulate notice
could include a complete prohibition of notice, the Court recognized
that section 216(b) authorized a "representative" action.
This authorization surely must carry with it a right in the repre-
sentative plaintiff to notify the people he would like to represent
that he has brought a suit, and a power in the district court to
place appropriate conditions on the exercise of that right. It also
follows that counsel for the representative plaintiff could seek
from the district court an order approving the notice, to protect
himself from being accused of stirring up litigation in violation
of state law . . .60
Finally, the court determined that the district court had no
power to communicate directly with nonparties, because the nonpar-
ties might mistake the court's communication as implying a court-
sanctioned lawsuit.61
V. The Circuits Revisited"
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the reasoning in the
58. Id. at 580.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Cf., 686 F.2d at 582 (Eschbach, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Two Circuit Courts of Appeals not already discussed have also considered the notice
issue, but not on interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District of Columbia
Circuit was faced with the notice issue in an unusual case, Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs brought class action claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
CLASS ACTION NOTICE
Seventh Circuit's 1982 decision unpersuasive, when it considered the
notice issue in 1984.63 To formulate its opinion on the procedural
scope of a section 216(b) action, the court focused on the legislative
history of section 216(b). Its conclusions were not warranted by that
history.
A. Section 216(b) of the FLSA in Historical Context
Enacted in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act established
rules on minimum wage and overtime compensation to protect the
American worker." In addition to a specific scheme for public en-
forcement by the Secretary of Labor, the Act provided in section
216(b) for both individual and "representative" actions to enforce its
provisions." In 1946, the United States Supreme Court greatly ex-
panded employer liability under the Act by holding employers re-
sponsible to pay for the time employees spent walking to and from
their work stations after arriving at the work place.66 The result of
this revised interpretation of the FLSA was a voluminous number of
lawsuits pressing for additional wages. 67 These lawsuits were brought
under section 216(b) of the Act, often by a "representative" suing on
behalf of a "class" of employees." The 1947 Amendments to the
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
As an amendment to the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act utilizes the enforcement scheme of §
216(b) of the FLSA, just like the ADEA. After conditional certification of the Title VII class
under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs moved for notice to be sent to
potential Equal Pay Act plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 23(d) ("for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action"). The judge denied the motion, but
died before the case was finished. The successor judge subsequently denied the motion when it
was raised again before him. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed on the basis that no
reversible error had been committed, but with no apparent understanding that if notice had
been ordered under § 216(b) of the FLSA, it should not have been pursuant to Rule 23(d) of
the Federal Rules. In a footnote the court intimated no view on the propriety of notice in a
dual Title VII and § 216(b) lawsuit, and cited Braunstein and Kinney Shoe as conflicting
opinions on the notice issue. 678 F.2d at 270, n.8.
In Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984) plaintiffs alleging age discrimina-
tion sought class certification for their action. The district court judge recognized that a Rule
23(b)(2), FED. R. Civ. P. class action would be improper, but nevertheless conditionally certi-
fied an "opt-in" class and authorized plaintiffs to send notices to the potential members of the
class. The court declined to certify its decision for interlocutory appeal, and the employer
appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Finding the collateral order doctrine not applica-
ble to the case, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.
63. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984).
64. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676 §§ 6 & 7, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-63
(1938).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23; Annot., 67 A.L.R. FED 282 (1984). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1976) for the Congressional findings and declarations of policy.
66. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
67. See Portal to Portal Act of 1947, supra note 31, at § l(a).
68. See McNicholas v. Lennox Furnace Co., 7 F.R.D. 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
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FLSA, also known as the Portal to Portal Act, were designed to end
these lawsuits. 69
The "policy" of Congress in the 1947 amendments was declared
to be, in part, "to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts"
since the judicial interpretation cited above had created "wholly un-
expected liabilities" under the Act which could not be "permitted to
stand." Without the Act, "the courts of the country would be bur-
dened with excessive and needless litigation and champertous prac-
tices would be encouraged. 70
The 1947 Act also amended section 216(b) under the title of
"Representative Actions Banned." The amended section provided:
Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court
of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and
in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such ac-
tion unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action
is brought.
71
The 1947 amendments thus made two changes. First, they elimi-
nated the provision in the original Act whereby a designated agent
or representative could maintain the lawsuit on behalf of employees.
Senator Donnell, chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee
that conducted hearings on the Portal to Portal Act, had referred to
the agent/ representative actions as
[C]ases in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous
of stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is per-
mitted to be the plaintiff in the case, [and] may result in very
decidedly unwholesome champertous situations which we think
should not be permitted under the law.71
69. See Portal to Portal Act of 1947, supra note 31, at 84-85.
70. Id. at 84. The House Report also stated the following:
The procedure in these suits follows a general pattern. A petition is filed under
Section 216(b) by one or two employees on behalf of many others. To this is
attached interrogatories calling upon the employer to furnish specific informa-
tion regarding each employee during the entire period of employment. The fur-
nishing of this data alone is a tremendous financial burden to the employer.
H.R. REP. No. 71, 80 Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947) reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE
1029, 1032. This statement on the discovery burden for employers under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the FLSA has been used out of context in recent Court opinions considering
the notice issue. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, at 1267 discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 74-83.
71. Portal to Portal Act, ch. 52, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1982)).
72. 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell (R.-Mo.)).
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The second change in the amended section 216(b) addressed the old
problem of how to determine who was bound by judgment in a
"'spurious" class action. The amended section 216(b) required each
prospective plaintiff to consent affirmatively or "opt into" the suit in
order to be bound by the judgment. 3
B. Tenth Circuit Analysis
The Court in Dolan v. Project Construction Corporation recited
some of the legislative history for the 1947 Amendments, but did not
place it in the context of the original Supreme Court cases compel-
ling those amendments. 7 ' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals mis-
read Congressional intent when it stated: "The opt-in language of §
216(b) was a direct result of this clear Congressional dissatisfaction
with the original class action provisions of the FLSA. In fact, the
relevant language of § 216(b) was entitled 'Representative Actions
Banned' in the Portal-to- Portal Act."'7 5 In fact, as pointed out
above, the "opt-in" language simply clarified the procedure for a sec-
tion 216(b) "spurious" class action so that any plaintiff wishing to
benefit from an FLSA class action had to sign up before, not after,
trial. Furthermore, although "Representative Actions Banned" did
refer to the elimination of the nonemployee agent/representative
suits, the procedural scheme for FLSA actions obviously still envi-
sioned representative ("on behalf of other employees similarly situ-
ated") actions.76 When the Tenth Circuit stated that "[Cilearly,
Congress sought to limit the nature of a class action suit based upon
an alleged FLSA violation,"' it was correct only in one respect.
Namely, the agent/representative suit was abolished in 1947. There
is no evidence that Congress intended to further limit class actions
under the FLSA. 8
After these incorrect historical conclusions, the Tenth Circuit
compared section 216(b) and Rule 23 actions and suggested that di-
ametrically opposed policies underlie each. The court stated:
The Rule 23 action encourages 'litigation in which common in-
terests, or common questions of law or fact prevail, disposed of
73. Spahn, supra note 56, at 129. See also supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
74. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984).
75. 725 F.2d at 1267.
76. The Tenth Circuit itself recognized that the FLSA still provided for "collective and
representative actions." 725 F.2d at 1267.
77. Id.
78. Indeed, in 1947 it was still nineteen years before Rule 23 would be amended to
eliminate "spurious" class actions.
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where feasible in a single lawsuit.' This policy of encouraging a
single suit is served by the opt-out procedure. However, the §
[2]16(b) action tends to discourage collective litigation by virtue
of the requirement of an affirmative act by each plaintiff."
It is possible to argue that collective litigation has been discour-
aged by the way in which the courts have interpreted section 216(b),
but to suggest that the inherent policies of Rule 23 and section
216(b) are diametrically opposed is not supported by law or by his-
tory. If section 216(b) is the old Rule 23 "spurious" class action, the
Rule 23 policy concern (at least between 1947 and 1966) to promote
a single lawsuit where feasible would have been identical with that
of section 216(b). Although Rule 23 was amended in 1966, the coin-
cidence between section 216(b) and old Rule 23(a)(3) in the years
between 1947, when the opt-in language was adopted, and 1966 sug-
gests that the Tenth Circuit's conclusion is wrong. This calls into
question the court's decision that it has "passive duties and limited
jurisdiction" in a section 216(b) lawsuit simply because it is not a
Rule 23 class action.
80
The Tenth Circuit decision provides additional contradictory
guidance. After concluding that "the court is without authority to
issue notice to all potential plaintiffs,"81 several paragraphs of dicta
follow by which a plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel could conclude that
they may not be restricted from "noticing" potential plaintiffs. The
court wrote: "[R]ecent United States Supreme Court cases regard-
ing legal communication dictate the allowance of a level of reasona-
ble communication by the plaintiff and counsel with those parties he
can discover without judicial assistance.""2 The court distinguished
certain situations, such as under the ADEA, in which political objec-
tives may override those of pecuniary gain in the solicitation of cli-
ents, and communication therefore should not be limited. The court
noted that it should be "hesitant to restrict written communication
in light of the ability to monitor such communications for statements
that are likely to deceive." 83 If, however, courts cannot be involved in
the notice issue, it is doubtful that those courts could "monitor" that
notice. The tenor of the opinion suggests that notice should not be
79. 725 F.2d at 1267 (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1268.
82. The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the court "may not order the production
of names of all possible plaintiffs for the sole purpose of establishing or notifying the class." Id.
at 1267.
83. Id. at 1268.
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limited, at least in some types of cases, if the court does not take an
active role in discovery or contacting parties. Yet the holding in the
case, and the confusion in the opinion could be expected to curtail
any plaintiff from "noticing" additional potential plaintiffs without
court approval. Whether that approval would be forthcoming is far
from clear.
C. Eighth Circuit Analysis
In McKenna v. Champion International Corp.,84 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals focused its attention on the issue of
whether plaintiff's counsel can contact prospective class members.
Starting with the premise that such contact serves primarily "to pro-
cure remunerative employment," 85 the court analyzed the attorney's
right to send the notice in the context of commercial speech.86 If this
premise is incorrect, however, the court probably reached the wrong
conclusion. Securing basic rights to employment for older citizens
could be the primary purpose for notice, and this purpose is not nec-
essarily or exclusively for the purpose of economic gain. First, non-
profit organizations are not the exclusive guardians of all public
rights.8 7 Second, a lawyer seeking to make the best case for his or
her individual client may quickly realize that it would be of great
benefit to the client for the action to proceed as a class action.88
Finally, if only those older persons who qualify for free legal assis-
tance can hope for the possibility of notice to prospective class mem-
bers, a system has been created whereby middle and upper class
plaintiffs are denied an effective remedial tool - the class action -
under the ADEA.
The court's reasoning belies its conclusion that attorney notice
is improper. Concern about stirring up litigation - the "heightened
susceptibilities of nonparty class members," and the possibilities of
"false and misleading" 89 communications - is probably best dealt
with by court supervision of these communications. The court stated:
"An invitation from counsel to particular plaintiffs to join a particu-
84. 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 1214.
86. Id.
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1982); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 320 (1968).
88. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(5) (1982); ANNO-
TATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 88-91 (1979). Halverson v. Convenient Food
Mart, 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972).
89. 747 F.2d at 1215.
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lar lawsuit is potentially a champertous communication." ' If the
court assumed a supervisory role and reviewed the invitation before
it was sent, champerty could be avoided.
The court admitted that a compelling argument had been made
in Woods and Dolan that the creation of a class action must carry
with it some right to notify class members. The court's response begs
the question. The court reasoned: "In ADEA actions, we may as-
sume that potential class members have constructive knowledge of
their rights. Employers are required by the EEOC to post a notice in
a conspicuous place on the premises. The notice advises individuals
of the right to file suits charging unlawful age discrimination.""1 An
unsuccessful job applicant may not have been on the employer's
premises to see the notice and/or would have little reason to suspect
age discrimination as the reason for being turned down for the job.
Furthermore, even if potential class members do have constructive
knowledge of their right to be free from age discrimination, this
hardly resolves the issue of a right to notify other potential class
members once a lawsuit is filed.
VI. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
When the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
was enacted in 1967,92 the enforcement provisions of the Act were
engrafted onto the Fair Labor Standards Act,'3 not the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which proscribed discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, and national origin. 9'4 Since Rule 23 class actions are
allowed for cases brought under the Civil Rights Act, it is necessary
to understand why the ADEA uses the enforcement procedures of
the FLSA to negate the possibility that Congress meant to preclude
notice similar to Rule 23 notice to potential plaintiffs in ADEA
actions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained a provision requiring
the Secretary of Labor to study the causes of discrimination in em-
ployment because of age, and to recommend legislation to prevent
that discrimination.'" This requirement was the result of a Congres-
90. Id. at 1217.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1968) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982)).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (describing the enforcement of the ADEA under the provi-
sions of the FLSA).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1982)).
95. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
CLASS ACTION NOTICE
sional compromise which excluded a prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on age in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 Testimony on
the issue of age discrimination during hearings on the 1964 Act indi-
cated that the cause of discrimination on account of age might be
different than the cause of race or sex discrimination. Congress de-
cided that a study by the Secretary of Labor was needed before leg-
islation to end age discrimination in employment was drafted.
The Secretary's Report was submitted to Congress in June
1965. The main distinctive characteristic of age discrimination, com-
pared to race or sex discrimination, was stated to be "rejection be-
cause of assumptions about the effect of age on [the] ability to do a
job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions."1'7 The
study recommended educational programs to attack ill-founded as-
sumptions about older persons' ability to work, as well as appropriate
re-education, training and counseling services for older persons.'
In 1966, Senator Jacob Javits and others suggested amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act to bar age discrimination in em-
ployment, but the provisions were rejected in committee. Under the
heading "Additional Views" in the Senate report, several senators
joined Javits in expressing the view that the barriers confronting
older workers were: (1) arbitrary and unjust age limits on hiring,
imposed by employers because of prejudice or misunderstanding; and
(2) insufficient skills or education to qualify for entry into an in-
creasingly technological job market." Relying on the 1965 Secretary
of Labor report, the senators reiterated the nation's urgent need for
an age discrimination bill. Furthermore, they indicated that placing
enforcement within the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor, which already enforced age provisions affecting child la-
bor, would be most effective.100 The 1966 Amendments to the FLSA,
however, only required the Secretary of Labor to submit to Congress
his specific recommendations for appropriate legislation.101
The stage that was set in 1967 was, therefore, very different
from that preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The "problem"
U.S.C. § 715 (1982)).
96. Spahn, supra note 56, at 156 n.230.
97. Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress, The Older Am. Worker, Age Dis-
crimination in Employment 2 (1965) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 21-22.
99. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1966, S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3002 (1966) (Additional views of Mr.
Javits, Mr. Prouty, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Griffin are located at 3045).
100. Id. at 3046.
101. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat.
830, 995 (1967).
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Congress ostensibly was trying to resolve had been defined as amena-
ble to solution primarily through nonlegal methods such as educa-
tion. Senator Yarborough, floor manager of the bill on age discrimi-
nation, discussed the enforcement provisions of the bill prior to its
passage. He stated:
While the bill includes enforcement procedures which are
adopted from the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is the hope of
the sponsors of this legislation that such procedures will not be
needed very often. Rather, it is the fact that our national policy
as declared by this bill will be to stop invidious distinctions in
employment because of age. Everyone who testified at our hear-
ings felt that the greatest need in this area was to educate em-
ployers to the facts - facts which show that older workers are
at least as productive as younger workers and that on average
they stay with their employers for a longer period of time. De-
spite the general notion to the contrary, it is the younger work-
ers who are the big job shifters. Older workers are usually more
experienced and more stable workers. It will be the major job of
the Department of Labor under this bill to educate the country
to the fact that older workers are just as capable employees as
younger workers.10o
In the Senate Report, reference is made to the fact that the bill
did authorize an individual as well as the Secretary of Labor to seek
remedies through court action. There is nothing in the legislative his-
tory, however, to indicate that any thought was given to what type of
class action might be appropriate or necessary for those discrimi-
nated against on account of age.103
VII. What Should Be Done
It is extremely doubtful under the conflicting precedents now in
place that a consistent sanctioning of a notice procedure for FLSA
plaintiffs will happen. This effectively removes a procedural tool for
victims of age discrimination in employment. To remedy the situa-
tion, the most efficient course is for the United States Congress to
amend section 216(b) to specifically allow notice to potential plain-
tiffs in actions brought under the FLSA. Revised section 216(b)
could read, in part:
102. 113 CONG. REc. 31253 (1967) (emphasis added).
103. The Administration Bill had proposed agency type hearings before the Secretary of
Labor for its enforcement scheme (i.e., the NLRB model) but this idea was rejected by the
Congress in favor of the already established FLSA enforcement mechanism. S. REP. No. 723,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967).
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An action . . . may be maintained . . . by any one or more em-
ployees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other em-
ployees similarly situated. Such employee, or employees, may
notify other similarly situated employees of the pendency of the
action, provided that notice must be approved by the court in
which the action is brought. No employee shall be a party plain-
tiff . . . [unless his] consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.
1 04
The suggested revision removes the judicially-imposed prohibi-
tions against notice, while making clear that FLSA class actions still
require potential plaintiffs to "opt-into" the action. Therefore, unless
or until Congress decides that all class actions should be brought
pursuant to Rule 23, any FLSA plaintiff "may" send notice to po-
tential plaintiffs, but is not required to do so by considerations of due
process. The revision would preserve and sanction the management
role of the judiciary, prevent champertous solicitation on the part of
attorneys, promote effective implementation of Congressional policy,
and ensure that victims of age discrimination are not denied an in-
tended remedial tool.
104. The underlined sentence is a proposed addition to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

